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Introduction 
 
 
Burying Heads in Geneva Sands 
Without Dismantling the Sectarian Crux of Assad’s Rule, Syria Peace Talks Are Unlikely 
to Usher in Stability 
Khaled Yacoub Oweis 
A web of corruption involving the Assad family, the security apparatus, and their 
business cohorts has been a major factor behind the outbreak of the Syrian revolt that 
started in 2011. UN-facilitated talks between the regime and the opposition are set to 
convene in Geneva in January 2016, after the refugee crisis in Europe and Russia’s entry 
into the Syrian war prompted a renewed international push to solve the conflict in 
Vienna. The proposed “thematic” negotiations ambitiously cover humanitarian issues; 
the military, terrorism, and security; the constitution and political systems; institutions 
and reconstruction. Germany set up an international fund for the rebuilding of Syria in 
2013. But a deal that does not tackle fundamental imbalances linked to the domination 
of Assad’s Alawite sect risks repeating the reconstruction debacle of post-Saddam Iraq, 
inviting the Sunni majority to scuttle any stabilization and recovery efforts. 
 
Attacks by the so-called Islamic State on 
civilian targets have accelerated a de facto 
rehabilitation of Bashar al-Assad in Europe 
and the United States. The attacks have also 
prompted a near abandonment of a 2012 
deal between international powers (known 
as the Geneva Communiqué) to seek a polit-
ical transition in Syria. A new agreement to 
end the conflict was reached in November 
2015 in Vienna, comprising a wider range 
of international and regional powers, most 
importantly Iran. The Vienna statement, to 
which Germany is a party, calls for a cease-
fire and the establishment of “inclusive and 
non-sectarian governance” as well as a new 
constitution followed by elections. It em-
phasizes the objective of a preservation of 
state institutions, including the adminis-
tration, army, and security apparatus. Yet, 
those organizations are dominated by 
Assad’s minority Alawite sect and have 
been viciously geared toward internal re-
pression. The result of a hasty international 
compromise with no Syrian input, the 
Vienna framework ignores the revolt that 
preceded the civil war. Therefore, it does 
not provide the space to address the secta-
rian security core of the regime, as well as 
the pervasive, corrupt economic network 
that has sustained Alawite domination over 
Syria for five decades. Rather, international 
actors are mainly motivated by the idea 
that the army and security services could 
become a nucleus for fighting the Islamic 
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State along with pro-regime militia and 
vetted rebel groups. The approach toward 
Syrian institutions is also partly driven by 
the desire not to repeat the experience of 
the dismantling of the Iraqi army after the 
2003 US invasion, which was later seen as a 
move that swelled the ranks of an insur-
gency. The legacy of post-Saddam Iraq has 
curbed US involvement in Syria and will 
cast a shadow when the Assad regime and 
opposition representatives are due to meet 
again in Geneva in early 2016. 
The “Alawization” of Syria 
The family succession that brought Bashar 
al-Assad to power in 2000 ushered a concen-
tration of Syria’s economy into the hands of 
the ruling Alawite elite and business associ-
ates, stoking the resentment of the Sunni 
majority that culminated in the revolt a 
decade later. Along with limited economic 
liberalization, Bashar’s rule was marked by 
a partial lifting of bans on media and com-
munications, but the opposition remained 
banned and the police state changed little 
from the iron-fisted rule of his father. The 
economic liberalization brought to the fore 
a new class of mostly younger businessmen 
who had access to Assad when he was being 
groomed to become president. As “friends 
of Bashar,” the new class of businessmen 
milked the economy and national resources, 
such as oil fields and public land. They 
joined an older class of profiteers and black 
marketers nurtured by Hafez al-Assad, who 
had adopted a mixture of socialism and 
state capitalism. 
By the outbreak of the revolt in March 
2011, Syria’s per capita income hovered 
around US$2,500, on par with Egypt’s. Un-
employment was independently estimated 
to be up to 25 percent, as liberalization of 
the economy had done little to improve com-
petiveness, curb unemployment, or develop 
the country. Lifting of bans on imports and 
free enterprise had expanded the scope of 
unofficial interference in commerce and 
business. Extortion of merchants, shopkeep-
ers, and regular citizens by a security appa-
ratus dominated by Assad’s Alawite sect 
had deepened. Corruption plagued the judi-
ciary and bureaucracy. Public procurement 
contracts and tenders were mostly handed 
through frontmen to three regime figures. 
The three were, and remain, Assad’s brother 
Maher – the most powerful figure in the 
military – and two of their cousins: Rami 
Makhlouf and Zuhayr Shalish, who heads 
the presidential guard. By 2011, dilapidated 
infrastructure required US$85 billion to be 
fixed. Corruption had run the bureaucracy 
into the ground to the extent that it could 
not respond to a water crisis that destroyed 
the agriculture-based economy of eastern 
Syria. The crisis drove hundreds of thou-
sands of the region’s Arab Sunni and Kurd-
ish inhabitants to flee to Damascus and 
other cities, contributing to a charged 
atmosphere by the time of the revolt. 
Sectarian Corruption and Control 
The water crisis was as much a result of 
drought as of corruption in a state-run agri-
culture industry, which helped deplete the 
water table through the unauthorized dig-
ging of wells. The United Nations stepped 
in with emergency food aid in 2010. In the 
same year, up to 3 million Syrians – out of a 
population of around 22 million – had sunk 
into “extreme poverty,” deprived of food, 
drinking water, sanitation, health, proper 
shelter, and education. Economic and 
human development indicators fell sharply 
with the start of the civil war. 
Yet, the revolt broke out in the relatively 
prosperous city of Deraa, in the southern 
Hauran plain. The pro-democracy demon-
strations in the city were sparked by arrests 
made by the secret police of children who 
had scribbled on walls anti-regime graffiti 
inspired by Arab Spring slogans. But finan-
cial and social resentment had already been 
building from within the majority Sunni 
population in Deraa and in other regions. 
Entrepreneurs, graduates, and professionals 
had expected to benefit from economic 
liberalization but were confronted with 
expansive levels of Alawite-administered 
SWP Comments 52 
December 2015 
3 
corruption. In the public sector, hiring also 
favored Alawites. Typically, young Alawite 
recruits would come from coastal regions 
into the interior regions with little experi-
ence and be appointed as principals of 
schools or heads of government depart-
ments, whereas local Sunnis languished at 
lower strata. At higher levels, the prime 
minister and most ministers in successive 
cabinets under Bashar (and his father) were 
– and are – still Sunni. But power rests with 
mostly Alawite department heads through-
out the executive apparatus, with backers 
in the intelligence apparatus as well. Up to 
75 percent of managerial positions in the 
bureaucracy were estimated to have been 
held by Alawites before the revolt. Their 
proportion is thought to have increased 
since then, as the regime tightened its grip 
on sectors such as state media and Sunnis 
began to be seen as “suspect elements.” A 
similar proportion of Alawites dominated 
the officer corps before defections took 
place due to the revolt. Military intelligence 
and air force intelligence provided another 
layer of control over Sunni foot soldiers. 
Secret police branches also interfered in 
the daily lives of regular Syrians. For ex-
ample, intelligence operatives would put 
pressure on public schools to accept stu-
dents whose parents had paid bribes to 
security officers to admit their children. In 
higher education, grants favored Alawites, 
who were often awarded scholarships, to 
the disadvantage of more qualified Sunnis 
or applicants from other minorities, con-
tributing to a degradation of the education 
system. State universities often produced, 
for example, English literature graduates 
who could hardly speak or write English. 
Public healthcare existed mostly in name, 
as patients had to bribe doctors and nurses 
for a semblance of care at most government 
hospitals. Supplies were stolen to the point 
that patients at times had to bring their own 
bandages. Al-Mujtahid, a main hospital in 
the center of Damascus, was so notoriously 
bad that it was known as “the butchery.” 
Perceived Property Grab 
Sunni frustration was compounded by the 
seizure of private and public lands by the 
military, as well as other expropriations 
seen to be advantageous to the friends of 
Bashar, who started investing in real estate 
as restrictions on the sector were lifted. 
Alawites were granted sweeping priority 
in the bureaucracy and military. This 
prompted greater levels of Alawite migra-
tion from the coast to the interior and an 
encroachment on Sunni properties and 
public lands. For example, the Fourth 
Division – a praetorian guards army unit 
headed by Bashar’s brother Maher – has 
been blamed for the mass expropriation of 
Sunni-owned land in the western Damascus 
districts of Somariya, Daraya, Mouadamiya, 
and Mezzeh, where housing was built for 
the mostly Alawite members of the divi-
sion. Large tracts of empty land in other 
Syrian cities were cordoned off as belong-
ing to the military and intelligence units. 
This pushed urban population growth into 
more crowded quarters and has contrib-
uted, since the 1980s, to the growth of il-
legal buildings, known as ashwaiyat (ran-
dom), which account for more than half 
of all urban construction across Syria. The 
ashwaiyat residents, mostly comprised of 
poor Sunnis, often fall prey to extortion by 
corrupt officials and bureaucrats. In 2007, 
the governor of Homs, Iyad Ghazal, an-
nounced the “Homs Dream” project to 
remove illegal housing and turn the city 
into a commercial hub, capitalizing on its 
location near the border with Lebanon. 
Ghazal was another friend of Bashar, and 
the project was seen by Sunnis as a guise 
for a land grab by the local Alawite popu-
lation because it proposed demolishing 
mostly Sunni property in Old Homs. With 
the advent of the revolt, the project was 
abandoned. Residents of Old Homs, as well 
as other Sunni districts in the city, marched 
in demonstrations and militarized after the 
regime sent tanks into the city in May 2011. 
By 2012, most Sunni districts of Homs had 
fallen to rebels. Loyalist troops and militia 
sacked the city the following year. The city 
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was ethnically cleansed, thus turning the 
city from majority Sunni to majority Ala-
wite. Complicating any possible restoration 
of Sunni residents’ rights, a fire destroyed 
the city’s land registry while it was under 
the control of the regime in 2013. 
The Judiciary Compromised 
Property disputes in Homs and elsewhere 
tarnished the Alawite community, as the 
sect became seen as benefiting the most 
from corruption and was identified with 
the security apparatus, which increasingly 
interfered in daily life. Opening a business 
often required bribes to obtain clearances 
from a plethora of security branches. Syrians 
underwent “security investigations” for 
mundane reasons, such as when making or 
receiving a power of attorney. 
In the judiciary, which has been marred 
by bribery and kangaroo courts, an esti-
mated 2,000 judges were employed before 
the revolt. Bribes were paid to security 
operatives who would order judges to skew 
verdicts. For example, a Western oil services 
company was swindled out of millions of 
dollars before the revolt by a member of the 
rubberstamp Syrian parliament who did 
business on behalf of the company in Iraq. 
The company approached an intermediary 
who was a protégé of Assef Shawkat, a secu-
rity chief who was killed in 2012 and also 
Assad’s brother-in-law. In return for a cut 
of any money recouped, Shawkat offered to 
threaten the businessman that his parlia-
mentary immunity would be lifted and that 
he would be prosecuted. 
If a defendant and a plaintiff both re-
sorted to bribes, the process turned into a 
de facto auction for the verdict. In one case, 
a political dissident “convinced” the judge 
presiding over the dissident’s trial to hand 
down a three-year sentence – instead of a 
standard five years – by arranging to pay for 
construction materials at a summer house 
the judge was building. In the criminal jus-
tice system, Alawites were rarely prosecuted 
because many in the community have family 
in the intelligence apparatus. The security 
apparatus itself was above the law, accord-
ing to a law decreed during the rule of 
Hafez al-Assad. The law was scrapped during 
reforms to placate demonstrators in April 
2011, but in practice, the regime’s security 
underpinnings have not been subject to any 
domestic persecution. 
Regime’s Smuggling Base 
Traditionally, smuggling has been the main 
source of windfall profits for the ruling hier-
archy, dipping during liberalization from 
2000 to 2011 and resuming after the revolt. 
Smuggling rings – in cahoots with the mili-
tary and the intelligence apparatus – filled 
a vacuum that had developed during 
broader bans on imports in the 1970s and 
1980s. Numbering in the thousands, 
smugglers brought in goods, mainly from 
across the border with Lebanon. They regu-
larly passed through, or next to, border 
crossings staffed by customs officials linked 
to Assad’s brother Maher, who is thought 
to have dominated the cigarette smuggling 
trade into Syria. The smuggled goods cov-
ered everything from cement, bread, medi-
cine, steel for construction, and cosmetics 
to toilet paper. Smuggling shops, owned 
mostly by Alawites from the coastal moun-
tains, sprouted up near the Fourth Division 
headquarters in the district of Somariya on 
the western edge of Damascus. The illicit 
shops in Somariya and elsewhere kept oper-
ating despite the lifting of restrictions on 
imports under liberalization. New supplies 
came through Makhlouf, who was awarded 
a monopoly to build and operate border 
and airport duty-free shops. The duty-free 
goods were supposed to be taken outside 
Syria and be subject to tariffs if they were 
taken inside the country. Instead, the smug-
glers used Makhlouf’s duty-free depots on 
the border with Lebanon and Jordan to 
smuggle goods into Syria, with the author-
ities turning a blind eye to any activity 
sourced to Makhlouf. Smuggling also 
worked from Syria to Lebanon under the 
supervision of the Syrian army and intel-
ligence units. Subsidized Syrian diesel – 
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often shipped in trucks by Syrian soldiers 
on a “military lane” across the Jdeideh–Mas-
naa border crossing – was sold for triple the 
price in Lebanon. 
But illicit money was also made in ports, 
oil and gas fields, telecommunications, and 
infrastructure. Latakia, Syria’s biggest port, 
has been the domain of various strands of 
the Assad family since the 1970s, when the 
port became controlled by Jamil al-Assad, a 
brother of Hafez al-Assad. The takeover of 
the ports by the Assads was twinned by the 
family’s control of the customs department. 
A job at customs – such as an inspector at 
one of the several border crossings with 
Lebanon – was so prized that it was prac-
tically auctioned. At Latakia and the port 
of Tartous to the south, extorting cargo 
owners has been a lucrative business, on 
top of illicit port activity. Vessels carrying 
foodstuffs would be impounded on dubious 
claims of violating Syrian standards. The 
owners would have to pay bribes for the 
cargo to be released or face demurrage and 
other costs related to the forced delay of the 
ship. If a cargo owner could not pay, a friend 
of Bashar would offer to buy the cargo for 
well-below market price, then use his con-
nections to end the cargo’s seizure and 
make a profit. To give but one example, the 
extortion extended to a 150,000-ton wheat 
purchase from France, agreed on during a 
visit by Assad to Paris in 2009. The last 
shipment in the deal was stopped at Tar-
tous. It took four months to resolve the 
issue, costing the French seller €1 million 
in shipping charges. 
Corruption’s Icon: Makhlouf 
In the wider economy, revenue streams 
that developed as a result of liberalization 
were awarded to Makhlouf in the form of 
outright or quasi-monopolies. The bonanza 
started in the telecom sector in 2001 with 
Makhlouf’s company Syriatel being granted 
one of two mobile phone concessions. The 
second license went to the Mikati family, an 
Assad family protégé in Lebanon. The way 
the mobile phone sector was being handed 
to Assad’s cronies prompted public criticism 
from Aref Dalila, a prominent Syrian econo-
mist. For speaking out, Dalila ended up 
spending seven years in jail. But Makhlouf 
and a new class of crony capitalists expand-
ed their wealth and connections to the 
leadership and security apparatus to levels 
that raised the stakes and left little to 
others. This contrasted with the economy 
under Hafez al-Assad, which offered fewer 
opportunities for corruption because it was 
mostly closed. 
In the 2006–2007 period, Makhlouf led 
an effort to consolidate the regime’s capi-
tal, setting up the larger of two holding 
companies that comprised the friends of 
Bashar. The two firms, Cham Holding and 
Souria Holding, had cross-share ownership, 
and both embarked on real estate projects 
and infrastructure takeovers. Controlled by 
Makhlouf, Cham Holding was the more 
aggressive one, building a large headquar-
ters at the southern entrance of Damascus. 
But US sanctions imposed on Makhlouf in 
2008, specifically for corruption, limited 
his commercial attraction to investors. The 
measures against Makhlouf upped the ante 
from the sanctions first imposed on the 
regime in 2004 for its suspected role behind 
violence in Lebanon and Iraq, as well as sup-
port for militant groups. They prohibited 
the export of US goods to Syria, other than 
food and medicine, and froze assets of Syrian 
entities and individuals suspected of involve-
ment in “terrorism” and weapons of mass 
destructions. 
In an attempt to raise his international 
business stature, Makhlouf tried in the 
same year to sell Syriatel to Turkish mobile 
operator Turkcell for an estimated US$1 bil-
lion. The deal was aborted because Turkcell, 
which came under pressure from Washing-
ton, apparently chose not to risk American 
wrath. Additional US and European sanc-
tions were imposed on Makhlouf and other 
Assad cronies two months after the start of 
the revolt in 2011 in response to the mili-
tary crackdown on the peaceful protest 
movement. Whatever damage the new sanc-
tions caused, it appeared manageable, as 
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Makhlouf and others in the ruling hierarchy 
became players in the war economy, enjoy-
ing continued access to the commercial 
hubs of Dubai and Beirut. Syriatel has also 
remained a cash cow for the Assad regime. 
In line with the younger generation of 
businessmen who befriended Assad, Makh-
louf owes his rise to his father, Mohammad 
Makhlouf, who is the main power behind 
the scenes in the state and the economy, 
and the brother of Assad’s mother, Anisa. 
He is thought to have made hundreds of 
millions of dollars in the 2006–2008 period 
from the sale of a company called Dublin 
Energy, which comprised little more than 
an oil concession in Syria, to a Chinese firm. 
After the deal, the Makhloufs remained 
active in the oil sector through service con-
tracts and Gulfsands, a London-listed com-
pany with oil exploration and production 
rights in the eastern province of Hasakah. By 
2014, Hasakah province was mostly captur-
ed by Kurdish militia and the Islamic State. 
Mohammad Makhlouf controlled key 
appointments in government as well as in 
the justice system and the central bank. For 
example, the current central bank governor, 
Adib Mayaleh, is a protégé of the Makh-
loufs. Similar to Iraq under Saddam Hus-
sein, the bank has effectively been the per-
sonal financial house of the ruling clique, 
together with state-owned banks. In 2005, 
the Syrian pound weakened following the 
assassination of Lebanese statesman Rafik 
Hariri. Zouhair Sahloul, Syria’s main black-
market money changer, was apparently 
brought into the central bank and given 
access to conduct forex operations with the 
country’s dollar reserves to halt the slide of 
the local currency. Sahloul was linked to 
the Makhloufs. He helped the Syrian pound 
recover, but he is thought to have profited 
handsomely from his power to influence 
the exchange rate by deciding when to 
pump – and how much – hard currency 
reserves into the market. In 2006, the gov-
ernment lifted bans on private money ex-
change companies and Sahloul opened a 
chain of currency exchange bureaus. 
New Faces in War Economy 
The exchange rate plummeted from 48 Syr-
ian pounds to the US dollar on the eve of 
the revolt to 394 Syrian pounds to the dollar 
by November 2015. The scope for commerce 
thus has sharply narrowed, and business-
men with substantial operations outside 
Syria, such as Vienna-based Nabil Kuzbari, 
have mostly chosen to distance themselves 
from Assad. For them, the threat of Western 
sanctions appear too damaging to their busi-
ness interests that depend, among other 
factors, on access to Europe. Among the 
prominent businessmen, a handful have 
actively supported the opposition. Most 
notably has been Ayman Asfari, head of the 
oil services firm Petrofac, which operates 
from London. Asfari is also apparently ac-
ceptable to Russia – Assad’s most powerful 
backer – as a representative of what Moscow 
regards as non-terrorist opposition. In the 
Gulf, Ghassan Abboud, who made his for-
tune in trading in the United Arab Emir-
ates, owns Orient Television, the opposi-
tion’s main media outlet. Abboud also set up 
a network of charity hospitals and schools 
in rebel areas (for an earlier assessment 
of the interests and positioning of Syria’s 
business elite, see SWP Comments 22/2013). 
Others jumped at the opportunities 
provided by the war economy, chief among 
which has been a return to the smuggling 
heydays of Hafez al-Assad’s rule. Sanctions 
and hostilities between Turkey and the 
Syrian regime have restored Lebanon as the 
main supply route to Damascus and other 
loyalist areas. The Lebanese Shi’ite militia 
Hezbollah and its influence on the Leba-
nese police and intelligence units patrol-
ling the border has facilitated the move-
ment of goods. On the other side, Turkey 
has been the main supplier to rebel-con-
trolled areas. A new warlord-businessmen 
class active in importing fuel, other daily 
necessities, and consumer items have thus 
emerged in both camps, as well as in Islam-
ic State territory. In Damascus, Ayham al-
Assad, once a junior member of the Assad 
clan, became a chief smuggler of diesel and 
other goods to the capital. Ayman Jaber, a 
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previously small regime operative from 
Latakia, supplies diesel to the coastal 
region.   
Signaling a change of faces since the civil 
war, new elections and government appoint-
ments to the board of the Aleppo Chamber 
of Commerce in 2014 brought in 10 new 
members out of 18. At the Damascus Cham-
ber of Commerce, 15 out of its 18 top tier 
were replaced in the same year. The two 
organizations have long been the who’s 
who of the regime’s business associates. 
The changes reflect attrition in the regime’s 
longtime partners, as well as the emergence 
of new frontmen and previously unheard 
of figures now making money in the war 
economy. At the same time, the core regime 
tier appears to have adapted. Makhlouf in 
particular has taken a lower profile and is 
thought to be operating behind new front-
men. 
Lone Reformer Turned Mediator 
Before the revolt, economic policy had been 
the domain of Abdallah al-Dardari, deputy 
prime minister for economic affairs. Dar-
dari believed that reform of the economy 
would restore Syria’s middle class and ulti-
mately usher in political change. A Sunni, 
Dardari privately criticized the Makhloufs 
and others he called “mafias.” But he was 
powerless to stop the liberalization from 
becoming another tool of Alawite domina-
tion. Indeed, the economic opening he 
championed provided those who made 
fortunes from smuggling and other illicit 
activities with the means to channel their 
liquidity. As a government official, what 
Dardari was able to do was within the tech-
nical sphere, such as writing anti-trust and 
other rules and regulations that did not 
apply to the security apparatus and ruling 
elite. Corruption and the inherent sectari-
anism of the system also remained beyond 
Dardari’s mandate. In one instance in 2010, 
a Western investor in a Syrian company 
asked Dardari for help in fending off gov-
ernment officials with links to intelligence 
who were hampering business. Dardari 
made it clear that he could not interfere in 
a matter that could put him at odds with 
the security apparatus. 
Dardari left the regime after the out-
break of the revolt and joined the United 
Nations Economic and Social Commission 
for Western Asia (ESCWA), where he has 
been in charge of the “national agenda for 
the future of Syria.” Germany has contrib-
uted around US$2 million in financing for 
the project. Under Dardari’s supervision, 
bureaucrats in the Assad government and 
some members of the opposition – mostly 
with a research background – have met sev-
eral times since 2013. The meetings were 
billed as a “track two” effort, compared to 
the international diplomatic efforts to end 
the war. Among the opposition, many view 
Dardari with unease and consider the UN 
project to be a vehicle for his self-promotion. 
Still, it helped raise Dardari’s profile as a cen-
trist and crucial figure in any settlement. 
More importantly, Dardari has steered 
clear from raising issues linked to the core 
of Syria’s economic and political order, 
such as sectarianism, monopolies, the role 
of the security apparatus, and Sunni-Ala-
wite property disputes. Even if substantive 
issues were to be raised, no one in the Assad 
regime – except the very top of the ruling 
circle – would dare discuss them. 
Conclusion and Recommendations 
A common chant by demonstrators in the 
early months of the Syrian revolt was “Rami 
Makhlouf and the 40 thieves.” But the 
friends of Bashar would not have achieved 
control over Syria’s economy without part-
nering with the security apparatus, which 
has been responsible for the killing, torture, 
rape, and disappearance of countless Syr-
ians since the revolt – a fact nowadays often 
forgotten by the international community 
due to the rise of al-Qaeda-affiliated groups 
and the Islamic State. Yet, without struc-
tural changes to Alawite domination and 
an end to the disenfranchisement of the 
country’s Sunni majority and the system of 
control and corruption, no sustained reso-
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lution to the Syrian civil war is likely, even 
if a deal is struck in Geneva. 
Indeed the framework for next year’s 
Geneva talks between the regime and the 
opposition appears to set the stage for a 
deal that would expand participation in the 
government and parliament but would not 
address the structural impediments to an 
inclusive and less repressive and corrupt 
system. Some Sunnis could sign on to such 
a compromise, but it would do little to halt 
the larger insurgency or rebuild the coun-
try and its institutions, and would instead 
allow the failed old system to continue. 
For a solution that could garner significant 
Sunni backing as well as broader Syrian 
support, Geneva would need to focus on 
dismantling the Alawite deep state and the 
business-security nexus that has financed 
it. Otherwise, reconstruction could end up 
involving the same robber barons who rode 
roughshod over reformists such as Dardari. 
But only pressure put on the regime by 
international sponsors of the talks, particu-
larly Russia, could result in a peaceful dis-
mantling of the plethora of sectarian secu-
rity outfits, which have had close links with 
Moscow since the Alawite takeover of power 
in the 1960s. In this regard, amnesty could 
encourage Alawites in the security appa-
ratus to leave office, especially those in the 
higher ranks who have amassed the most 
loot. A compensation mechanism would 
also have to be negotiated to deal with land 
disputes, one that allows Alawites to keep 
property they may have acquired illegally 
before the revolt, since a major reason that 
Alawites stick with the regime is the fear 
of a restoration of property rights to their 
former owners. But no reconciliation can be 
achieved without an overhaul of the legal 
system. This would need to include an 
agreement to identify the most corrupt 
judges and those closely linked with secu-
rity and to consign them to retirement. 
In the field of post-conflict reconstruc-
tion, Iraq is a cautionary tale. Billions of 
dollars were spent for rebuilding, but cor-
ruption deepened and infrastructure barely 
improved from the catastrophic levels ex-
perienced during UN sanctions from 1990 
to 2003. Iraq’s new rulers have done little 
to establish better governance. In addition, 
jihadists fed off the failure of the govern-
ment to integrate Sunnis in the political 
system. Among the lessons of Iraq is the 
damage dealt to the remaining technical 
talent in the bureaucracy through a de-
Baathification policy that extracted mem-
bers of the Baath Party across the bureau-
cracy, regardless of rank and degree of in-
volvement in the Saddam era. Some tech-
nical staff eventually attended ideological 
rehabilitation courses offered by post-
Saddam governments and re-joined the 
bureaucracy. But many soon left because 
they could not cope with what they regarded 
as a suffocating atmosphere. Similar to 
Saddam’s Iraq, many Baathists officially 
joined Syria’s Baath Party to increase their 
leverage in government employment. The 
party itself has been ruling in name only, 
with the top Alawite tiers taking over real 
power. The proposed Syria talks should 
focus on how to redress the imbalances in 
the bureaucracy without replacing Alawite 
sectarianism with Sunni sectarianism. 
In addition, it is imperative to curb the 
existing monopolies. If the fragmentation 
of Syria is halted and large-scale projects 
were to become feasible, reconstruction 
funds would need to be kept away from 
an untested post-conflict government and 
placed under international administration, 
which could award contracts to Syrian 
firms only if they meet disclosure and anti-
corruption criteria. But the start of recon-
struction is likely to be small-scale in areas 
where ceasefires prove to hold. Already 
there exists a possible nucleus to identify 
and meet local needs in the form of the 
Syria Recovery Trust Fund. Set up under the 
auspices of Germany and the United Arab 
Emirates in 2013, the fund was established 
as an international reconstruction mecha-
nism, but it has been financing only small 
projects in non-regime areas, due to a lack 
of security and an active opposition govern-
ment on the ground. 
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